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THE PROTECTION OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS
Joseph Jaconelli
Preliminary Remarks
Historically Western political theory has been concerned with the
classic human freedoms; for example, the right to vote and to hold public
office, freedom of speech and assembly, liberty of conscience and freedom
of thought, freedom of property, freedom from arbitrary arrest, search
and seizure. It is a trite observation that nowadays as much emphasis is
placed on the so-called economic and social rights; the right to a decent
standard of living, the right to education, or (to take as example the
subject-matter of these papers) the right to development.
The dichotomy between these two types of rights is reflected in
various documents.1 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which
was adopted by resolution of the U.N. General Assembly on 10th December
1948, places both types side by side.2 Contrast, for example, Article
9: No one shall be subjected to arbitrary -arrest, detention or exile and
Article 10: Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public
hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal in the determination of
his rights and obligaticns and of any criminal charge against him. with
Article 22: Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social
security...and Article 25:
Everyone has the right to a standard of living
adequate for the health and well-being of himself
and of his family...and the right to security in
the event of unemployment, sickness, disability,
widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in
circumstances beyond his control.
How, then, do we define 'economic and social rights' for the purpose
of this paper? The term is used by some writers to include all rights
which touch on the proprietary, commercial or industrial areas of life;
for example, the right to peaceful enjoyment of one's property (or, at
any rate, the right not to be deprived of it without the payment of just
compensation), or the right to form trade unions and to pursue free
collective bargaining. In this paper, however, these rights will be
included, rather, in the traditional category of civil/political rights.
In common with the standard civil/political rights, they require for
their implementation mere abstention from action on the part of the
State, and to that extent they lend themselves more readily to
enforcement by the courts. Economic and social rights, on the other
hand, as defined in this paper presuppose for their effective protection:
(a) a minimum level of economic development in the country in
which they are to be effectively secured; and
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(b) an administrative machinery for the detailed running of the
service in question.
In short, such rights are egalitarian in their aim and they require
positive intervention on the part of the State. It may be, of course,
that the vigorous pursuit of collective bargaining by free trade unions
will result in a more egalitarian distribution of wealth. Our dividing
line, however, between the two types of rights still holds. The rights
associated with the conduct of industrial disputes are secured by marking
out an appropriately limited role for the State.
Nevertheless, our crude division between civil/political and
economic/social rights is not watertight. This can be demonstrated by
taking several sample rights.
The right to education, at first glance, would appear to be a right
of the economic/social variety as the extent of its realisation depends
on the quantum and allocation of economic resources within the
community. On the other hand, the claims to parental control over the
nature of their children's education might seem to fall within the
traditional class of political rights. In some measure it would seem
enforceable, say, by annulling governmental schemes for abolishing the
private sector in education. Some reservations, however, should first be
entered. Above all, respect for parental wishes in educational matters
presupposes the provision of educational services by the State. This
obstacle may be circumvented by suitable drafting. For example, Article
2 of the First Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights3
provides:
...In the exercise of any functions which it
assumes in relaLion to education and to teaching,
the State shall respect the right of parents to
ensure such education and teaching in conformity
with their own religious and philosophical
convictions. (Emphasis added).
Moreover, within a publicly provided system of education, procedures
would have to be laid down for consulting parents' wishes on the
organisation of the schools.4
Equally, the right to vote might be considered the paradigm civil or
political right. Yet it is clear that its implementation requires very
detailed rules on such matters as the demarcation of constituency
boundaries, age-limits and residence requirements. To that extent the
right to vote has to satisfy requirement (b) of a genuine economic/social
right. It utterly fails, however, to demand the satisfaction of
requirement (a) in that the vote is not a scarce resource which cannot
effectively be enjoyed until the country in question has attained a given
level of economic development.
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The right to work is the last, and most complex, of our sample
rights. It possesses several aspects. Of that right it has been said:
A declaration of a right to work would be
silly, not only if it meant that there was nothing
wrong in working, but also if it meant that there
should be no law forbidding work. To speak of a
right to work is to claim that a positive
opportunity to work should be provided.
5
Yet If one examines all the factors bearing on a person's
opportunities for work, the most important single determinant - the level
of economic demand - lies clearly beyond judicial control. At this level
a constitutional guarantee of a "right to work" would amount to nothing
more than an exhortation to the government to keep the level of
unemployment as low as it is able. By contrast, the judiciary has had an
effective role to play when the worker's livelihood has been threatened
by either his employer or by a trade union. Threats from the former have
been parried in the English common law by the concept of "wrongful
dismissal."'6 Threats from the latter quarter have been met by awarding
the usual tortious remedies against trade unions seeking to enforce a
closed shop. Indeed, the complaint is sometimes heard that only in the
latter area, that of the closed shop, has the "right to work" been given
judicial recognition.7
A Theoretical Persoective
For certain writers, even to speak of a 'right to development' - in
the sense of a moral (as opposed to a legal) right to development - is
misconceived. These writers fall broadly into two categories. First,
there are those who regard all talk of 'natural' or 'moral' rights as
unintelligible. Among these may be mentioned Jeremy Bentham, who, in a
well-known phrase, castigated the whole idea of natural rights as
'nonsense or stilts'. A second category comprises thinkers who regard
the idea of natural rights as fundamentally tenable, but who take a view
of the scope of such rights which would exclude any supposed 'right to
development' as spurious. These include H.L.A. Hart8 and Robert
Nozick,9 who argue for a limited natural right: that of all men to be
equally free.
Indeed, to speak of a 'right to development' seems to deploy an
inappropriate use of the very concept of a right. To mark out a moral
right is characteristically to set an inviolable area which may not be
invaded, even if to do so would maximise the utility of the community as
a whole. For example, it might be shown that the public policy of
detecting criminals would be significantly advanced if all members of the
community were obliged by law to provide a record of their fingerprints
or, again, if the use of the thumbscrew and the rack were to be legal
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methods of interrogating suspects. Yet the exclusion of such devices is
characteristic of the way in which political theorists talk about rights:
the community goal must be pursued within the constraints imposed by
acceptable methods of policing. As Hart puts it,
There is of course no simple identification to
be made between moral and legal rights, but there
is an intimate connexion between the two, and this
itself is one feature which distinguishes a moral
right from other fundamental moral concepts. It
is not merely that as a matter of fact men speak
of their moral rights mainly when advocating their
incorporation in a legal system, but that the
concept of a right belongs to that branch of
morality which Is specifically concerned to
determine when one person's freedom may be limited
by another's and so to determine what actions may
appropriately be made the subject of coercive
legal rules.10
To deny the existence of a right to development is in no way to
denigrate the importance of development in the third world, but rather to
place the methods associated with economic development in the appropriate
category of political vocabulary. Industrialisation, say, might be
pursued through economic planning, but not at the expense of standards
which (however minimally) forbid the coercive redirection of labour or
the expropriation of property without compensation.
To speak of a 'right to development', even if it were coherent, would
be to assert a right in the strict sense: i.e., with a correlative duty
in someone else to provide the development in question. This aspect of
economic/social rights has been pointed out by Professor Maurice Cranston:
To speak of a universal right is to speak of a
universal duty...The so-called economic and social
rights, insofar as they are intelligible at all,
impose no such universal duty. They are rights to
be given things, things such as a decent income,
schools and social services. But who is called
upon to do the giving? Whose duty is it? When
the authors of the U.N. Covenant on Economic and
Social Rights assert that "everyone has the right
to social security", are they saying that everyone
ought to subscribe to some form of world-wide
social security system from which each in turn may
benefit in case of need? If something of this
kind is meant, why do the U.N. Covenants make no
provision for instituting such a system? And if
no such system exists where is the obligation,
and where the rightill
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Many of the traditional human rights (for example, of free speech and
assembly) are logically distinct. In the Hohfeldian sense12 they are
mere 'liberties' or 'privileges', consisting of the absence of a duty to
abstain from speaking one's mind and the absence of a duty to refrain
from assembling with whoever one chooses and in support of whatever cause
one selects. The economic/social rights, to continue with the
terminology of Hohfeld, are 'claim-rights' in that they impose a duty on
others.
It should be noted, however, that economic/social rights are not
unique .in this respect. For example, the right to privacy, in order to
make sense, must be a claim-right which imposes a correlative duty on
others not to intrude into one's privacy. Equally, freedom from torture
or from inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,13 or the
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments,14 are claim-rights
imposing a duty not to inflict treatment of the prohibited types. But,
once again, the correlative duties are of a negative content, nor do they
require the availability of financial resources for their effective
observance.
The logically distinct nature of economic/social rights was
emphasized by Professor Cranston in urging their elimination from
declarations - especially international declarations - of human rights.
His argument was that, "...a philosophically respectable concept of human
rights has been muddled, obscured and debilitated in recent years by an
attempt to1lncorporate into it specific rights of a different logicalcategory."A
Quite apart from logical considerations, a universal moral right,
according to Cranston, must meet several requirements.
First, there is the test of paramount importance. Are
economic/social rights indeed of lesser weight, as Cranston submits, than
the classic rights of liberty? Perhaps a blanket answer is impossible to
a question posed in such general terms. Much will depend on one's
selection of representative rights in the two categories. To starve may
be considered a worse fate than being denied the right to elect
governments by popular vote, but are holidays with pay really preferable
to freedom from inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment?
John Rawls's A Theory of Justice is, in part, a defence of the
absolute priority of liberty over economic and social advantages, at any
rate in a society which has attained a certain level of economic
development:
Now the basis for the priority of liberty is
roughly as follows: as the conditions of
civilization improve, the marginal significance
for our good of further economic and social
advantages diminishes relative to the interests of
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liberty, which become stronger as the conditions
for the exercise of the equal freedoms are more
fully realized. ... Let us note why this should be
so. First of all, as the general level of
well-being rises ... only the less urgent wants
remain to be satisfied by further advances, at
least insofar as men's wants not largely created
by institutions and social forms. At the same
time the obstacles to the exercise of the equal
liberties decline and a growing insistence upon
the right to pursue our spiritual and cultural
interests asserts itself .... In addition men come
to aspire to some control over the laws and rules
that regulate their association, either by
directly taking part themselves in its affairs or
indirectly through representatives with whom they
are affiliated by ties of culture and social
situation. 16
Secondly, in order to qualify as such, a fundamental moral right must
in principle be genuinely universal. This argument, it should be noted,
is not simply a reworking of the observation that many nation States in
the world today are in no way financially able to secure a certain level
of economic and social guarantees. Even if there were an abundance of
economic resources out of which every nation could guarantee the rights
in question, the fact remains that the right to holidays with pay - to
take Cranston's example - is only capable of being enjoyed by persons who
are employees. Since not everyone belongs to this class, the 'right'
cannot be a genuine universal right.
Is Cranston's objection conclusive? Certainly, the rights to free
speech and assembly are genuinely universal, being capable of exercise by
all persons and at all times. But are there not rights of the classic
political/civil type which are capable of being enjoyed only by persons
who fall (however temporarily) into a particular class? Are the freedom
from unreasonable search and seizure and the privilege against
self-incriminationl7 not rights which are exercisable only by those who
are the object of criminal investigation?
Our objection, then, to the idea of economic and social rights as
moral rights (and, in particular, to the idea of a 'right to
development') is based on its abuse of the concept of a right. It is not
founded on any inherent difference between these and the classic liberal
rights on the score of either importance or universality.
Written Guarantees of Economic and Social Rights
It is now time to turn to a consideration of positive law. Here the
distinctionbetween the classic political rights and those of an
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economic/social nature is borne out in several respects when we examine
the diverse methods of their protection and enforcement in written
catalogues of human rights.
The rights which are traditionally contained in a Bill of Rights may
be enforced in two distinct ways: by direct challenge or by collateral
challenge. Direct attack on an allegedly invalid statute (for example,
in proceedings for an injunction or a declaration) raises the issue of
constitutionality full square. The presence of certain difficulties,
however, in this method of challenge - most notably, the difficulty of
establishing locus standi - renders it less useful than collateral
attack. Under this method, say, a person who has been arrested under an
arguably unconstitutional provision will bring an action in trespass
against the police, the action raising as an incidental issue the
question of the constitutional validity of the provision under which the
police acted.
The denial of economic/social rights, by contrast, will seldom be the
outcome of a statute, decree or regulation. (It may take the form of a
benefit being granted to one group in society which is withheld, for
discriminatory reasons, from similarly placed groups). More often it
will take the form of a general unavailability of some benefit or
service, which can only be the subject of direct investigation. For
example, the standards of the European Soci Charter are kept under
scrutiny by a detailed system of reporting,10 under which the
Contracting Parties are obliged to inform the Secretary-General of the
Council of Europe at two-yearly intervals about the observance of the
obligations which they have accepted under the Charter. A similar
reporting procedure - through the U.N. Secretary-General to the U.N.
Economic and Social Council - constitutes the method-of implementation of
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Both
these instruments lack the sort of procedure founded on the grievance of
the individual which is such a striking feature of the parallel documents
in the realm of the traditional rights - the European Convention on Human
Rights (under Article 25) and the International Covenant on.Civil and
Political Rights (under the Optional Protocol).
With these preliminary observations now made, it will be instructive
to examine the techniques of protection of economic/social rights under
both international law and constitutional law.
The difficulty with any international guarantee of human rights (of
whatever type) is that it must perforce lay down a common minimum
standard for a number of nation States which have diverse legal
traditions and differing levels of economic performance. Thus, it is not
uncommon to encounter references in the case law to the 'margin of
appreciation' to be granted to States in fulfilling their obligations
under human rights documents of the traditional type, even though the
document itself imposes obligations in the most absolute and peremptory
terms. The obligation itself, however, is qualified and circumspect in
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documents treating of economic/social rights. Contrast, for example, the
categorical terms of the European Convention on Human Rights ("The High
Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction
the rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention")19
with the European Social Charter ("The Contracting Parties accept as the
aim of their policy, to be pursued by all appropriate means ... the
attainment of conditions in which the following rights and principles may
be effectively realized:"). 20 Again, the U.N. Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights provides that each Contracting State" ... undertakes to
respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject
to its jurisdition the rights recognized in the present
Covenan...",S while the Economic and Social Rights Covenant requires
each State Party "...to take steps...to the maximum of its available
resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realisation of
the rights recognized in the present Covenant..."'22
However programmatic such obligations may be, they nevertheless
impose binding obligations in international law.
The problems associated with economic and social guarantees may seem
less intractable in domestic law. The constitution makers would be
concerned only with the economic capabilities of the one country. Here,
however, difficulties stem from a different source. The restrictions of
the judicial role, as it is traditionally conceived, render the judiciary
an unsuitable instrument for weighing such complex questions as the
financial need of classes or groups and the allocation of scarce economic
resources.23 Such issues, it is-felt by eventhe most activist of
udges should be entrusted to the exclusive care of the legislature. As
e Smith perceptively wrote, "To fail to guarantee the right to work or
to enjoy social security may be bad politics, but it is not thought to be
bad law; ...,,24 This approach, of course, would create a bias in
favour of the classical 'abstentionist' freedoms.
Rather than omit all mention. of economic and related rights, some
constitutional documents entrust the safeguard of certain rights
exclusively to the legislature while that of other rights rests primarily
with the courts. This approach has been adopted most notably in the
constitutions of the Irish Republic, India and Nigeria.25 Sir Kenneth
Wheare wrote:
An appreciation of the difficulties which arise if
Courts are asked to enforce or apply declarations
of rights in a Constitution has led sometimes to a
decision by the framers of a Constitution that the
declaration of some rights at any rate shall not
be regarded as a collection of rules of law in the
sense that Courts are to be asked to recognise and
apply them, but rather as a statement of desirable
objectives.26
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To take .the Irish Constitution of 1937 by way of example, in addition
to the justiciable fundamental rights guaranteed in Articles 40-44,
Article 45 (entitled "Directive Principles of Social Policy") states:
The principles of social policy set forth in this
Article are intended for the general guidance of
the Oireachtas. The application of those
principles in the making of laws shall be the care
of the Oireachtas exclusively, and shall not be
cognisable by any Court under any of the
provisions of this Constitution.
An examination of the content of Article 45 reveals loosely defined
economic and social aspirations.27
Again, the Constitution of India 1949 was drafted so as to contain
both justiciable fundamental guarantees (Part III) and "Directive
Principles of State Policy" (Part IV). Article 37 states that the latter
"shall not be enforceable by any court" while recognising that they are
"nevertheless fundamental in the governance of the country". Article 39,
for example, stipulates that the State shall "direct its policy toward
securing" such objects as "(d) that there is equal pay for equal work for
both men and women" and "(f) that childhood and youth are protected
against exploitation and against moral and material abandonment."
Despite the seemingly conclusive wording of Article 37, the
"Directive Principles of State Policy" have been employed by the Indian
Courts in ruling on constitutional issues.28 For example, when a law
has been challenged as imposing an unreasonable restriction on any of the
seven justiciable rights guaranteed in Article 19, the fact that the law
in question sought to further one of the Directive Principles (e.g., the
maintenance of free competition) went some way towards indicating that it
imposed "reasonable restrictions" on one or more of the justiciable
rights (e.g., the right to "acquire, hold and dispose of property").
When we turn to glance at a few modern West European constitutions,
we see the short shrift given to rights of a socio-economic nature. The
Constitution of the Fifth French Republic (1958) lacks a specific Bill of
Rights, referring only to the French people's attachment to rights laid
down, inter alia, in the Preamble to the 1946 Constitution. These rights
incl~de the right to work (paragraph 3) and the right to social security
(paragraph 9). An (admittedly circumspect) right to work is declared in
Article 12(l) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of
Germany.29 Article 38 of the italian Constitution guarantees in
general terms a right to social security in circumstances such as
illness, old age or involuntary unemployment.
Perhaps the most interesting of recent developments have occurred in
the case law of the U.S. Supreme Court. Under cover of guaranteeing due
process or the equal protection of the laws or facilitating interstate
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movement the Court. has enforced the payment of a range of welfare
benefits30 - and all that while interpreting a constitutional text
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